This paper analyses the impact of uncertainty about the true state of the economy on monetary policy rules in the US since the early 1980s. Extending the Taylor rule to allow for this type of uncertainty, we find evidence that the predictions of the theoretical literature on responses to uncertainty are reflected in the behaviour of policymakers, suggesting that policymakers are adhering to prescriptions for optimal policy. We find that the impact of uncertainty was most marked in 1983, when uncertainty increased interest rates by up to 140 basis points, in 1989-90, when uncertainty increased interest rates by up to 50 basis points and in 1996-2001 when uncertainty reduced interest rates by up to 50 basis points over five years.
Uncertainty and Monetary Policy Rules in the United States
"Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape" (Greenspan, 2003) .
1) Introduction
Uncertainty is a central issue in monetary policy, as the quote from Alan Greenspan above illustrates. Empirical models, however, rarely take account of this, effectively assuming that policymakers ignore uncertainty. The evident focus of policymakers on uncertainty suggests that this assumption is invalid and therefore that empirical models of monetary policy must account for uncertainty. This paper considers the effects of uncertainty about the true state of the economy on monetary policy, estimating a monetary policy rule that allows for this.
Our empirical model draws on the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the true state of the economy, most prominently Woodford (2003, 2004) and Swanson (2004) .
In existing models of monetary policy under certainty, monetary policy affects inflation and the output gap directly, so it is optimal for policymakers to use these variables in forming monetary policy. This is the basis for the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993 ) model of monetary policy and its' subsequent refinements (eg Woodford, 2003) . The literature on monetary policy under uncertainty assumes instead that monetary policy affects the state of the economy, which in turn affects inflation and the output gap. It is then optimal for monetary policy to respond to the state of the economy. However, it is assumed that the state of the economy is unobserved and that policymakers must infer this from observations of inflation and the output gap. Optimal monetary policy is a certainty equivalent function of the expected state of the economy. The expected state of the economy is in turn a linear function of inflation and the output gap, whose parameters are functions of the variances of these variables.
The resultant optimal monetary policy rule resembles the familiar Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) , but where the coefficients are functions of the variances of inflation and the output gap. These apparent departures from certainty equivalence arise because of the role of inflation and the output gap as indicator variables for monetary policy. An increase in, for example, the variance of inflation reduces the parameter on inflation and increases the parameter on the output gap in the equation for the expected state of the economy. This leads to a smaller weight on inflation and a larger weight on the output gap in the monetary policy rule. Similarly, an increase in the variance of the output gap reduces the weight on the output gap and increases the weight on inflation in the equation for the expected state of the economy, resulting in a lower weight on the output gap and a corresponding larger weight on inflation. As a result, the model makes two main testable predictions. First, policymakers should respond less vigorously to variables that are more uncertain, so the weight on inflation in the policy rule should be lower when inflation is more uncertain and similarly for the output gap (cf Peersman and Smets, 1999 , Rudebusch, 2001 , Soderstrom, 2002 , Smets, 2002 , Srour, 2003 , Walsh, 2004 and Swanson, 2004 . Second, uncertainty about one variable may strengthen the response to the other variable, so the weight on the output gap may be larger when inflation is less certain, and vice versa (cf Peersman and Smets, 1999, and Swanson, 2004) .
We estimate a system of equations, comprising a monetary policy rule whose parameters are functions of the variances of inflation and the output gap and equations for inflation and the output gap whose error terms have GARCH processes, from which these variances are derived. We use data since 1983 since this is when the Fed switched to using the interest rate as the tool of monetary policy and since continuity in monetary policy objectives has allowed stable policy rules to be estimated over this period (eg Judd and Rudebusch, 1998) . We find that the behaviour of monetary policymakers is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature. Monetary policy responds less to inflation and the output gap when these variables are more uncertain. We also find that the response to inflation is stronger when the output gap is more uncertain, and vice versa. We quantify the impact of uncertainty by constructing a measure of the counterfactual interest rate, which would have been observed if there had been no uncertainty. We find that the impact of uncertainty was most marked in 1983, when uncertainty increased interest rates by up to 140 basis points, 1989-90, when uncertainty increased interest rates by up to 50 basis points and in 1996-2001 when uncertainty reduced interest rates by up to 50 basis points over five years.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains our methodology. Section 3 presents our estimates. Section 4 summarizes our findings and offers some conclusions.
2) Methodology
Our empirical model is based on theoretical contributions by Woodford (2003, 2004) and Swanson (2004) . We consider the model This model is similar to that considered by Swanson (2004) and comparable to that of Woodford (2003, 2004) . Equation (1) use the implied variances of υ and η to measure uncertainty about inflation and the output gap respectively (for a similar approach, see Grier and Perry, 2000) .
Policymakers are assumed to know all parameters of the model and the history of all variables save for the state of the economy, which is always unknown. (1) and (2). Changes in these variances therefore change the parameters of the monetary policy rule in (4), breaking certainty equivalence.
Extending Swanson's results to cases with forward-looking variables is difficult 2
and we cannot as yet make claims about the optimality properties of (4) in the forward-looking case (although Woodford, 2003, 2004 , have made some progress on this) 3 . Nonetheless we conjecture that Swanson's argument can be extended to the forward-looking case and will use the policy rule in (4) as the basis of our empirical model 4 .
The policy rule in (4) is a simple extension of the Taylor rule representation of monetary policy rules (Taylor, 1993) . Following the influential work of Clarida et al (2000) , the typical empirical model of monetary policy specifies the target for the nominal Federal Funds rate can be written as
where ĩ is the target nominal interest rate, * i is the equilibrium interest rate,
E π + is the inflation rate that at time t is expected for time (t+p), * π is the desired or target inflation rate, t t q E y + is the output gap that at time t is expected for time
ρ is the weight on inflation and y ρ is the weight on output. The adjustment of the actual interest rate towards the target is described by
and we can use ) 1 (
as a measure of interest rate persistence. The implied empirical monetary policy rule is therefore In (2), aggregate demand depends on the unobserved state of the economy. We therefore substitute (3) into (2) (1), (8) Equation (10) is simply the fitted value of (8) , the gap between the fitted value of the interest rate from estimates of (8) and the counterfactual interest rate, where a positive value of this gap indicates that interest rates were higher because of uncertainty.
3) Empirical Results
We use quarterly data for 1983Q1-2003Q4. The sample corresponds to the chairmanships of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, but excludes the period when the Federal Reserve targeted non-borrowed reserves, rather than interest rates 5 . We use the Effective Federal Funds rate as the nominal interest rate, inflation is the annual proportional change in the consumer price index and the output gap is the difference between the logarithm of GDP and the logarithm of the Congressional Budget Office measure of potential GDP. Preliminary unit root analysis (the results are not reported but are available on request) showed that the output gap is stationary whereas the order of integration of the interest rate and inflation is more ambiguous; we assume that all variables are stationary (see also Dolado et al, 2004 and Clarida et al, 2000 , for a discussion of similar issues).
Estimates of the simple Taylor rule model of monetary policy in (7) are presented in column (i) of Table 2 . We find that the data prefer a specification in which interest rates respond to the expected values of inflation and the output gap one quarter ahead and in which use two lags of the interest rate are used to capture the persistence effect. We treat inflation and the output gap as endogenous, replacing expected future variables with actual values and then estimate by GMM using lagged variables as instruments. We estimate that the weight on inflation is 1.58, that on output is 0.84 and the persistence parameter is 0.96. These estimates, which are comparable to other results in the literature (eg Judd and Rudebusch, 1998 , Clarida et al, 2000 , Dolado et al, 2004 , Castelnuovo, 2003 , satisfy the Taylor principle that excessive inflation should trigger increases in the real interest rate. They also indicate a moderately relatively strong response to the output gap (although this effect is insignificant) and show considerable interest rate smoothing. However, as Table 1b shows, the estimates fail the parameter stability test.
We estimated the system comprising equations (1), (8) and (9) for various configurations of the model, considering a range of values for j, k, p and q. Our preferred model has a contemporaneous response of the output gap to the real interest rate (k = 0) and includes two lags of the output gap in (9), whereas inflation responds to the current output gap (j = 0) in (1) and interest rates respond to the expected inflation and output gaps one quarter ahead (p = q = 1), so the preferred specification of the interest rates equation in our system is the same as that of the simple Taylor rule 6 . Since the conditional variance for inflation and output are generated regressors (see e.g. Pagan, 1984 and Pagan and Ullah, 1988) , the estimated variances from equations (1) and (9) Column (ii) of Table 1a presents estimates of the system comprising equations
(1), (8) and (9), while Table 1b presents measures of goodness of fit and misspecification tests. The estimates of equations (1) and (9) seem sensible.
The tests presented in Table 1b do not indicate misspecification, suggesting that we may have adequate measures of the conditional heteroscedasticity of inflation and the output gap. The variances of inflation and the output gap implied by the estimates in column (ii) are presented in figure 1.
Our measures of uncertainty, presented in figure 1 seem plausible.
Inflation uncertainty is greatest in the early part of the sample, following the change in Fed Chair in 1987, in the early 1990s and after the third quarter of 6 Estimates of these alternative models are similar to those reported in Table 1 , except for the case of a purely backward-looking Taylor rule (p = q = -1) where the inflation effect was negative.
Output gap uncertainty declines throughout the 1980s with resurgences in
the early 1990s and after late 1999. The low levels of uncertainty shown in figure   1 in the 1990s reflects the unusual stability of output and inflation in that period that has been noted by, among others, Mankiw (2001) .
Estimates of our proposed model of monetary policy under uncertainty in (8) (as part of the system also involving equations (1) and (9)) are presented in column (ii) of Table 2 Figure 3 depicts the contributions of inflation and output gap uncertainty to the gap between the fitted and counterfactual interest rates, constructed using the decomposition in (11). The gap is more closely correlated with the output gap effect, suggesting that the impact of uncertainty on interest rates is largely driven by output gap uncertainty, which generally outweighs the effect of inflation uncertainty. This is consistent with the comments of policymakers, whose focus 7 Recursive GMM is used to derive recursive estimates and standard errors of the parameters in (8) which are then used to construct
t y t t t t t y t t y t i i E E y E E y
is usually on output uncertainty (e.g. Meyer, 1999 , Greenspan, 2003 , and Yellen, 2003 .
Our model assumes that the only effect of uncertainty on monetary policy rules is on the response of the interest rate to inflation and the output gap. We also estimated alternative models of the impact of uncertainty on monetary policy rules. In particular, we added inflation and output gap uncertainty directly to the model in (8), producing a composite model that encompasses both our model and that of Dolado et al (2004) 8 . The direct effects of inflation and output gap uncertainty were insignificant suggesting that uncertainty only affects monetary policy by changing the response of interest rates to inflation and the output gap 9 .
We also considered models in which uncertainty affects the degree of interest rate smoothing 10 . This was not successful. We also considered an alternative model in which interest rates are affected by asset price disequilibria, measured by the lag of the log(dividend-price ratio) based on the S&P composite stock price index. As an alternative measure of asset prices, we also considered whether interest rates are affected by the growth of the S&P index (following 8 The model estimated was 10 The model estimated was Gertler, 1999, 2001) . Consistent with Bernanke and Gertler (1999) , we failed to find any effect.
We performed a number of robustness checks. We estimated our system using two alternative volatility measures, (i) derived from recursive estimates of our GARCH systems and (ii) measured as a four quarter backward-looking moving average of the measures derived from the estimates of Table 1 . We also used alternative measures of the output gap, obtained by (i) applying the Kalman Filter to our measure of the output gap, regressing the log of output on its lag and the unobserved state variable, assuming that the latter follows a random walk, (ii) using the Hodrick-Prescott filtered level of output as a measure of potential output and (iii) using real-time output data from the database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. A measure of the real-time output gap was constructed by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the real-time output to obtain a measure of potential real-time output. We also estimated our system using a measure of the average real interest rate, constructed as the difference between a four quarter moving average of the nominal interest rate and a four quarter moving average of the inflation rate (see Rudebusch, 2001) . Table 2 summarises the average weights on inflation and the output gap implied by these estimates and the correlations between the implied values of t π ρ and yt ρ and those implied by the estimates of (8). In most cases, the average weights on inflation and the output gap are similar to those in Table 1 , with correspondingly high correlations.
4) Conclusions
This paper has argued that the effects of uncertainty about the true state of the economy can be analyzed using a simple 3-equation system that captures the main features of the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in this case.
The system features a monetary policy rule that extends the familiar Taylor rule representation of monetary policy by allowing the weights on inflation and the output gap to depend on the variances of inflation and the output gap, these latter being derived from GARCH models. Estimating our model using data since the early 1980s, we have found that the actions of policymakers are consistent with the principles of optimal policy in that they respond less vigorously to inflation and the output gap when these are less certain. They also respond more strongly to one variable when the other is more uncertain.
We have used our model to calculate the counterfactual interest rate that our estimates suggest would have been observed if there had been no uncertainty. Using this, we found that uncertainty has a marked impact on monetary policy in three periods. We find that uncertainty increased interest rates following the switch to the interest rate as the tool of policy in the early 1980s and during the recession of the early 1990s, but that uncertainty reduced interest rates during the long expansion of the mid-late 1990s, when debate concerned the sustainability of high output growth.
Our findings suggest that the effects of uncertainty can be detected using simple empirical models of monetary policy rules. Our work can be extended in several ways. We might embed on analysis of monetary policy in a more sophisticated structural model in order to estimate the parameters of a structural model of optimal monetary policy. We might estimate our model over different time periods in order to identify occasions when the behavior of policymakers was not consistent with the predictions of models of optimal monetary policy. We might estimate our model using data for different countries in order to investigate the impact of different monetary policy regimes on the response to uncertainty.
We intend to address these issues in future work. Notes: Column (i) reports the parameter estimates of equation (7) in main text. Column (ii) report the parameter estimates of the system involving equations (1), (8) and (9) (Hansen, 1982) . For column (ii), J stat is a chisquare test of the system's overidentifying restrictions. The instruments are a constant, one lag of inflation and the output gap. Parameter stability is an F test of parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996) . Neglected ARCH is the Lagrange Multiplier F test on the squared residuals for remaining serial correlation of order 4. Numbers in square brackets are the probability values of the test statistics. gap betwe en fitted and counte rfactua l interest ra tes contribution of output gap volatility to the interest rate gap contribution of inflation volatility to the interest rate gap
